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by James S. Heller 
Copyright, Fair Use 
and the For-Profit Sector 
James S. Heller is the director of the law library and a professor of law at 
the Callege of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virgin ia. ' 
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INTERPRETING COPYRIGHT LAW IN LIBRARIES IS NOT AN EASY TASK. 
Applying the fair use provision (section 107) and the library exemption (section 108) of the Copyright Act to the for-
profit sector is particularly difficult. In determining whether a particular activity is permitted as a fair use under the 
section 108 exemption, one must dis'tinguish between the different types of for-profit institutions. On one hand are 
J 
copyshops, such as Kinkos, which generate income from making copies. Similar to copyshops are for-profit companies 
- such as TOI Library Services and Instant Information Systems - whose business is to provide docum~nt delivery 
services for a fee. Then there are companies, such as the Texaco corporation or law firms, whose business is not to 
make copies, but who instead reproduce copyrighted works only inddentally. 
Because they are not libraries, copyshops and fee-based 
document delivery companies do not qualify for the 
section 108 library exemption. And because they are 
in the business of making and distributing copies, it is 
doubtful that copying they do for their customers could 
qualify as a fair use. Copyshops and document deliv-
ery suppliers, however, are different from companies 
that do not directly profit from making copies for their 
customers. A review of selected litigation involving pub-
lishers and the for-profit sector sheds light on the ap-
plication of the fair use doctrine and library exemp-
tion in the for-profit sector. 
Litigation Involving Copyshops 
Publishers took on copyshops in the 1980's, beginning 
with a successful lawsuit by Basic Books against the Gno-
mon Corporation, which operated several stores in the 
Northeast. Gnomon was enjoined by a Connecticut fed-
eral district court from making copies of journal articles 
and book chapters, putting them together as compilations 
and selling them. 
1\vo subsequent cases received greater publicity than the 
Gnomon case, probably because the end-users were uni-
versity students. In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics 
Corp. 1, the copyshop was sued by several publishers for 
making photocopies of copyrighted articles and portions 
of books and compiling them in what are commonly·called 
"coursepacks." Kinkos maintained that the copying was 
educational because it was done for students at the re-
quest of their instructors. The federal district court dis-
agreed and described the copying as non-educational and 
commercial. The court concluded that E:inkos was a will-
ful infringer, criticizing its internal p~licies and proce-
dures and its failure to educate and adequately supervise 
their employees. 
The second case, decided in the 1990s, involved Michigan 
Document Service, a copyshop in Ann Arbor. In the "MDS" 
easel, a decision by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in favor of the copyshop 
was later reversed by the entire court. Unlike the Kinkos 
case, the Original appeals court panel called MDS's copy-
ing "educational" and held that its producing coursepacks 
for students at the University of Michigan was a fair use. 
The entire court reversed and held that MDS's systematic 
and premeditated copying for commercial motivation was 
infringing. (The court also noted that MDS's copying went 
beyond what was agreed to in the classroom guidelines 
envisioned by Congress that were included in the legisla-
tive history of the 1976 Copyright Act)l. 
litigation Involving For-Profit Document 
Deliverers 
In the early 1990s West Publishing Co., a publisher of law 
books, sued several for-profit information brokers for in-
fringement. One defendant (Aaron-Smith) settled with West 
and agreed not to copy and distribute the proprietary fea-
tures from West caselaw reporters, such as headnotes and 
synopses of the published court decisions. The other de-
fendant, Faxlaw, was enjoined from copying and distrib-
uting the proprietary features of West publications. 
Litigation Involving Businesses and 
Corporations for In-House Copying 
In the early 1980s, Harper & Row Publishers sued phar-
maceutical corporations American Cyanamid and E.R. 
Squibb for in-house duplication of copyrighted journal 
articles. Both cases resulted in out-of-court settlements, 
with each company agreeing to join and pay royalties to 
the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), a clearinghouse 
for the receipt of royalties. Under the Squibb settlement, 
the parties agreed that Squibb could be f.xcIuded from 
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reporting and paying royalties for up to six percent of 
their copying, which was considered fair use. 
A decade later, newsletter publisher Washington Busi-
ness Information sued the Collier, Shannon ·& Scott law 
firm for making cover-to-cover copies of newsletters and 
sending them to attorneys throughout the firm. The firm 
reportedly paid a huge amount of money to the publisher 
to settle the lawsuit4 • In 1999, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & 
MacRae (a large New York-based law firm) purchased a 
multi-year photocopying license with the CCC and paid 
. an undisclosed settlement to avoid a copyright infringe-
ment suit brought by four publishers. 
Although the result in each of these cases was similar-
a settlement or a judicial decision in favor of the plaintiff 
publisher-one must distinguish the cases on their facts. 
In the actions against the pharmaceutical companies and 
the law firms, the defendants were for-profit entities not 
in the business of profiting from making in-house copies 
of copyrighted works. By contrast, the for-profit docu-
ment deliverers and the copyshops directly profit from 
making copies of copyrighted works. The section 108 li-
brary exemption and the section 107 fair use provision of 
the Copyright Act should be applied differently to these 
different types of for-profit companies. 
Fair Use In The For-Profit Sector 
Section 107 provides that: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and I06A, 
the fair use of a copyrighted work, iT/.cluding such use 
by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other 
means specified by that section, for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (includ-
ing multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright. 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include: (l) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a comniercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished 
shall not itself bar a finding Oflfair use if such finding is 
made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
The extent to which in-house copying by a company not 
in the business of generating revenue from making cop-
ies may qualify as a fair use tal;:es us to the most impor-
tant in-house copying case, American Geophysical Union 
v. Texaco. The Association of American Publishers coor-
dinated the lawsuit against Texaco in the name of five 
publishers. Before trial, the parties stipulated that al-
information outlook 
though Texaco employed hundreds of research scientists 
(all or most of whom presumably photocopied scientific 
journal articles to support Texaco research), the trial 
would focus on activities of one scientist, Dr. Donald H. 
Chickering. II, who photocopied eight articles from the 
Journal of Catalysis and placed them in his files. In 1992 
a federal district court held that Thxaco's routing jour-
nals to Dr. Chickering, and his subsequent copying ar-
ticles and filing them away, was not a fair uses. 1\vo 
years later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit upheld the district court decision6 • 
The district court judge spent considerable time examin-
ing the first fair use factor-the purpose and character of 
the use. As for the purpose of the use, the juqge wrote 
that because the defendant was a for-profit company, its 
copying was "commercial." As for the character of the 
use, the judge wrote that the copying was not transfor-
mative; Dr. Chickering simply made mechanical photo-
copies of complete articles for his convenience and there 
was little evidence that he relied on the articles in con-
ducting later research. 
Texaco appealed the lower court decision to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals. In its examination of the first fair use factor, 
the appeals court used as guidance a case recently decided 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music7• 
In Campbell, the Supreme Court wrote that when a court 
looks at the purpose of the use, it must determine whether 
the use is nonprofit educational, for-profit commercial or 
something else. As for the character of the use, a court 
must determine "whether and to what extent it is 'trans-
formative: altering the original with new expression, mean-
ing, or message. The more trans formative the new work, 
the less will be the significance of other factors, like com-
mercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use"8 . 
The appellate court in Texaco struggled with the first fair 
use factor, .trying to determine if Dr. Chickering's copy-
ing was, as the district court concluded, commercial copy-
ing. Unlike the district court, the appeals court noted that 
Texaco did not directly profit from the copying. It con-
cluded that the purpose was neither "for profit" nor "non-
profit educational," calling it instead ·an "intermediate" 
use9• As in the district court .. the appellate court con-
cluded that the copying was not transformative. 
The appellate court also called Te."<aco's activities "archi-
val- i.e, done for the primary putpose of providing nu-
merous Texaco scientists with his or .her own personal 
copy of each article without Texaco having to purchase 
another original journal"IO. Although the court wrote that 
it did not intend to suggest that all archival copying is 
infringing, it concluded that the first factor tilted against 
Texaco because "the making of copies to be placed on the 
shelf in Chickering's office is part of a systematic process 
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of encouraging employee researchers to copy articles so 
as to multiply available copies while avoiding payment" II . 
The appeals court concluded its discussion of the first 
factor by writing: 
"On balance, we agree with the district court that the first 
factor favors the publishers, primarily because the domi-
nant purpose of the use is a systematic institutional policy 
of multiplying the available number of copies of pertinent 
copyrighted articles by circulating the journals among 
employed scientists for them to make copies, thereby serv-
ing the same purpose for which additional subscriptions 
are normally sold, or, as will be discussed, for which pho-
tocopying licenses may be obtained"'2. 
The second fair use factor examines the nature of the 
work copied. Copying informational; scientific or factual 
works is more favored than copying more creative (or 
expressive) works such as fiction or poetry. Because the 
purpose of copyright is to promote the progress of sci-
ence and the useful arts (in today's terms, "knowledge"), 
copying factual, scientific or other scholarly works is more 
likely to achieve this overarching goal. Both the district 
and appeals courts characterized the articles in Catalysis 
as factual in nature and concluded that the second factor 
favored Texaco. 
Texaco lost the third factor in the fair use analysis-the 
amount copied-in both· courts. As a general matter, the 
more of a work that is copied, the less likely it is that the 
defendant in a copyright suit will win this factor. We must 
remember there are two copyrights involved in journal 
publications. First, the issue of the journal may be copy-
righted as a compilation. Second, e::tch journal article is, 
in itself, a complete copyrightable work. Copying entire 
articles, as was done by Dr. Chickering, invariably re-
sults in the defendant losing this third factor. 
The fourth fair use factor examines the effect of the use 
on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work. Simply put, courts are more likely to find an in-
fringement when the copyright owner incurs financial 
harm due to unauthorized (or uncompensated) copying. 
The fourth factor has an interesting and somewhat com-
plex history, and deserves more comment. 
In 1985 the Supreme Court called the fourth factor "un-
doubtedly the single most important element of fair use"IJ. 
A decade later in Campbell, the Court wrote that no fac-
tor has primacy over any other. 
The Campbell Court said much more about the fourth 
factor that does not bode well for fair use. It wrote that 
When examining harm to the copyright owner, a court 
should consider whether the market lost was one con-
templated by the copyright owner. This may include the 
impact on the market for derivative works, such as the 
information outLook 
market for reprints of a journal article or book chapter 
and royalty or licensing fees. The Court also wrote that 
courts should examine more than the market impact of 
the individual defendant's copying. Rather, they should 
also consider "whether unrestricted and widespread con-
duct of the sort engaged in by the defendant ... would re-
sult in a substantially adverse impact on the potential 
market for the original"14. Both the district and appellate 
courts in Texaco noted: the publishers lost sales of addi-
tional journal subscriptions, back issues and back vol-
umes, as well as licensing revenue and fees; the Copy-
right Clearance Center makes it easy to pay royalties; and 
the fourth factor favored the publishersl5 • 
The fourth factor also presents another ele~ent-which 
party has the burden of proving that the plaintiff was 
harmed? One might think that a plaintiff in a copyright 
suit must carry this burden, but that is not always the 
case. Recall the first fair use factor-the purpose and char-
acter of the use. In Campbell, the Supreme Court wrote 
that a court shc;lUld presume harm-and thereby require 
the defendant to. demonstrate that the market for the work 
copied was not harmed-when there has been verbatim 
(non-transforming) copying for commercial purposes. In 
other words, when both the "purpose" and "character" 
portions of the first factOr are held against the d'efendant-
when the copying is both commercial and non-transfor-
mative-a court will presume that the plaintiff was 
harmed by the use. In such cases, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to prove that the plaintiff was not harmed, a 
difficult (and probably insurmountable) challenge. 
Texaco instructs us that large scale routing of journals to 
researchers in a for-profit company, and subsequent copy-
ing of articles by researchers who filed the copies away 
(often without even reading them) to create their own per-
sonal mini-libraries, is not a fair use. The appeals court 
concluded that systematic routing of journal articles to 
company employees, with knowledge that the employees 
would then copy articles and create personal "libraries," 
was beyond that which is permitted under section 107. 
So where does this leave us? Remember that fair use is 
an equitable rule of reason. Whether a particular use is 
fair, or instead infringing, depends on the particular facts 
of the case. Failure to purchase as many subscriptions a 
company really needs-if large-scale copying either by 
the library or by end users substitutes for subscriptions-
is problematic not only in a for-profit company such as 
Texaco, but also in nonprofit educational institutions. 
But the Second Circuit did not say that all copying in for-
profit companies is infringing. Although organizations 
such as the Association of American Publishers and the 
Copyright Clearance Center might like businesses to think 
that the holding in Texaco applies to every instance of 
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commercial copying, that's simply not the case. The court 
confined its ruling "to the institutional, systematic, ar-
chival multiplication of copies revealed by the record-
the precise copying that the parties stipulated should be 
the basis for the District Court's decision now on appeal 
and for which licenses are in fact available"16. But the 
analysis does not end with section 107; we also must con-
sider the section 108 library exemption. 
The Section 108 Library Exemption 
Section 108 of the Copyright Act permits libraries to make 
copies for their patrons under certain circumstances. The 
legislative history of the Act indicates that the library 
exemption applies to both the for- and nonprofit sectorsl7 • 
In addition to permitting some level of in-house copying, 
section 108 also permits libraries to engage in interlibrary 
transactions to acquire a copy of a journal article or an 
excerpt from a book for their institutional patrons, such 
as students and faculty in a university, corporate research-
ers or law firm attorneys. 
Section 108(d) permits making cOPi~S of articles and ex-
cerpts from copyrighted works, but there are some basic 
requirements for qualifying for the section 108 exemption: 
• The library may only make or acquire a single copy of 
an a~cle or excerpt for the patron who requests it; 
multiple copies are prohibited. 
• The copy must become the property of the requestor; 
the library may not add it to the collection. 
• The library must not profit directly or indirectly from 
the copy; it cannot charge clients more than the copy 
cost, nor profit in any way from making such copies. 
• The copy must inclUde the notice of copyright from 
the copy reproduced, or if it is not available, a legend 
tha.t reads that the material copied is subject to the 
~ll1t~d States copyright law and that further reproduc-
tion m violation of that law is prohibited. 
• The library must include on its order form, and at the 
p.lace where orders are accepted, a warning of copy-
nght as specified by the Copyright Office. 
• The library must be open to the public or to research-
ers in a specialized field. A library may meet this last 
reqUirement if it participates in reciprocal interlibrary 
lending/document delivery. 
by one or more individuals or by individual members of 
a group. Subsection (g) (2) prohibits a library from en-
gaging in the systematic reproduction or distribution of 
single or multiple copies. 
As noted earlier, Texaco was not decided under section 108; 
the parties agreed it would be decided on fair use alone. But 
one thing appears clear: although the library apparently was 
routing journals to Thxaco researchers, it was not making 
copies for them. Had the library been making multiple cop-
ies of the same article for different researchers throughout 
the corporation, a court might have concluded that the copy-
ing was prohibited by the subsection (g) (1) prohibition 
against "related or concerted" copying. And if the library 
was making copies of different articles from the ~ame jour-
nal title in such quantity that photocopying substitutes for 
additional SUbscriptions, the subsection (g) (2) prohibition 
against systematic copying kicks in. 
Whether the nature and level of copying in Texaco would 
have violated 108 (g) (1) or (g) (2) is a matter of specula-
tion. Significantly, the appeals court decision did not 
emphasize, as did District Court Judge Pierre Leval, the 
for-profit nature of Texaco. Nor did it make overbroad 
statements that corporate libraries have few rights under 
the library exemption. Because Texaco was not a section 
108 case, Judge Leval's statements are dictum-not ger-
mane to the issues before the court and not necessary to 
the holding of the case. 
The library exemption permits a library to engage in inter-
library arrangements, but not when the effect is that the 
library receiving such copies "does so in such aggregate 
quantities. as to substitute for a subscription to or purchase 
of such work. " The Copyright Act does not specify when a 
library might be using document delivery as a substitute 
for a purchase or subscription. For this, the Guidelines for 
the Proviso of Subsection 108 (g) (2), more commonly called 
the CONTU Guidelines, must be consulted. 
In a single year a library should not acquire through in-
terlibrary loan/document delivery (for any article pub-
lished within five years of the date of the request) more 
than five such articles from the same journal title. The 
"Suggestion of 5" does not apply if the library has en-
tered a new subscription to the journal or if it already 
subscribes to the journal but the requested issue is miss-
ing from the collection. Remember that this is a guide-
line, not an absolute rule. One could certainly reason that 
more than five copies are permissible when a researcher 
is working on a short-term, one-time project. 
Conclusion 
Section 108 rights are not unlimited; sections 108(g)(1) 
and (2) include important restrictions. Subsection (g) (1) 
proVides that a library may not engage in related or con-
certed reproduction or distribution of multiple copies of 
the same material, whether made at one time or over a 
period of time and whether intended for aggregate use 
The primary purpose of copyright law, as the U.S. Su-
preme Court has written, is not to reward creators, but 
rather to promote the spread of knowledge IS. Fair use 
information outlook 
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decisions are fact-specific. If you have a factual situatign 
just like those in Texaco-large scale systematic copying 
to create individual research collections for corporate re-
searchers who often do not even use the articles copied-
permission or payment of royalties is necessary; But the 
appeals court did not say that a researcher in a for-profit 
company could not occasionally copy articles or short 
excerpts from books. Ubrarians should not expand the 
holding in Texaco beyond the facts of that case. 
The same is true when the library is making copies un-
der the section 108 library exemption. An institution need 
not acquire a journal subscription for every employee who 
might read it. (Most publishers already price institutional 
library subscriptions conSiderably higher than individual 
subscriptions) . A library that qualifie's for the library ex-
emption-whether in a nonprofit academic institution or 
a for-profit company-may, under 108(d), make single 
copies for employees if it meets the requirements of sec-
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